1. At a meeting with Admiral Raeder at Rastenburg, Hitler pressed for Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen to be withdrawn from Brest to counter an expected invasion of Norway, Hitler’s "Zone of Destiny".
2. On 29th December 1941, Hitler insisted on the ships being brought back to the North Sea, or the ships being paid off, having all of their main armaments removed for coastal defence in Norway, and the hulls scrapped.
3. On 12th January, Vizeadmiral Ciliax agreed to the concept of sending the ships through the Channel, providing that they were guaranteed air cover by the Luftwaffe. Lt. General Jeschonnek agreed to provide 250 fighters between Brest and Hamburg. Hitler emphasized the importance of surprise: "If one ship is not ready, the other two must go." The only provision was that the Prinz Eugen should not sail alone.
4. Hitler also suggested that Mussolini be informed that KM Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were breaking out to the Pacific to assist the Imperial Japanese Navy.
5. The optimum date was 12th February, when high water at Dover was at the optimum time of 0930 within the period of maximum darkness.
6. Since the ships could reach maximum speeds only in deeper waters, marker buoys indicated channels with depths in excess of 15 meters. 119 mines were cleared in advance from these channels by 80 minesweepers.
7. The weather forecast was "slight to moderate sea, with winds not in excess of 20 kph / 13 mph, visibility no more than 16 km / 10 miles, cloud 10/10".
8. Long range weather forecasts by FW 20's confirmed 12th February.

1. Bomber Command bombed and mined the Brest area and the cleared channels on the route along the Channel from 11th December onward, every night.
2. Sir Philip Joubert, C-in-C Coastal Command, noticed increased numbers of German destroyers and torpedo boats in the Channel, and that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen had been observed taking part in exercises together. He predicted in a Memorandum that the German Squadron would try a break-out through the Channel about 10th – 15th February.
3. With the destruction of the Bismarck in mind, the strategy was to cripple the German Squadron by means of torpedo aircraft, so that surface ships could sink them.
4. Coastal Command set up three patrol lines, "Stopper", to the east of the Brest Peninsula, "Habo", and "Line SE".
5. Joubert noted that 15th February, when there would be no moon, would be a tentative date.
6. Joubert’s conclusions were in agreement with those of Fighter Command, Bomber Command, and the Admiralty.
7. Only Admiral Bertram Ramsay thought that a daylight break-out would be attempted, and that the RAF and RN forces lacked the necessary torpedo bombers to stop the German Squadron. He therefore requested and received the redeployment of 825 Squadron from Lee-on-Solent to Manston. All of Coastal command’s other torpedo bomber squadrons were in the Mediterranean.

1. From 11th December onward, Coastal Command and Bomber Command bombed and / or mined the Brest area and the presumed route to the North Sea every night.
2. The RN went on immediate notice every night from the beginning of February, against a nighttime passage through the Straits of Dover.
3. HMS Sealion was given discretion to patrol the Brest Roads every night from 7th to 11th February. This was done, including recharging her batteries on the surface, and proceeding to sea every day. On station at 1900 to 2200 / 11th, but forced out to sea at about 2200 to recharge batteries.
4. Brest, 2030 / 11th, order given to German ships to raise steam.
5. ~2035 / 11th air raid warning sounded, followed by an air raid.
6. 2100 / 11th, all clear sounded.
7. 2245 / 11th, German ships weighed anchor.
8. 2200 / 11th, HMS Sealion recharging her batteries.
9. The 224 Squadron Hudson patrolling "Line Stopper" took off at 1900 from St. Eval, and immediately nearly collided with a Ju 88. The radar set was immediately switched off, and when being switched on again was found to be inoperative, and the aircraft returned to base.
10. The replacement aircraft arrived over the Brest area at about the time the German Squadron was leaving, but made no sightings.
11. The 224 Squadron Hudson patrolling "Line SE" arrived at 1930, but at 2055 the radar failed. It was decided to patrol the line Bréhat – Ushant in the hope of making a visual siting, but this proved impossible. At 2156, the aircraft decided to return to base.
12. No replacement aircraft was sent to patrol "Line SE".
13. "Line Habo" was patrolled by Hudsons of 223 Squadron, but at no time during the hours of patrol were the German ships within radar distance of the aircraft.
14. The German Squadron was off Alderney, due south of Portland Bill, at 0515.
15. The German Squadron was NW of Le Havre at 0800.
16. The German Squadron was NW of Dieppe at 0915.
17. Three large blips were sighted by Swingate Downs radar station using a Type 271 set, Dover, when the ships were 60 miles away, moving at 25 knots, at about 1000. Two Spitfires were scrambled from Hawkinge to investigate.
18. The German Squadron was not sighted until 1042 off Le Touquet, by two separate pairs of patrolling Spitfires from Kenley and Hawkinge.
19. At about the same time, Admiral Ramsey, acting on radar plots, decided that the German Squadron was in the Channel and informed the First Sea Lord.
20. Wireless silence was maintained until the aircraft landed at 1109.
21. The weather had deteriorated to 7/10 cloud, 1,400 yards visibility, cloud base at 600 to 900 feet.
22. The Admiralty confirmed to Admiral Ramsay that the German Squadron was approximately one hour’s steaming away from the Straits of Dover.
23. The Dover MTB Flotilla sailed at 1150.
24. The Harwich Flotilla had been taking part in gunnery exercises under the AA cover of a flotilla of Hunt class destroyers, and was informed that the German Squadron was in the Straits of Dover "shortly before noon".
25. The German Squadron was off Cap Griz Nez at 1156.
26. The heavy guns on the South Foreland opened fire at 1219.
27. 825 Squadron took off at 1220.
28. The Ramsgate MTB Flotilla sailed at 1225.

• Generaladmiral Alfred Saalwächter

  Position: Group Commander
• Admiral Schniewind

  Position: Fleet Commander

Total available fighter strength is approx. 252 planes. Losses amounted to 17 fighters and 11 pilots.

Plan is for capital ships to leave Brest at 2000. Continuous fighter cover will be by four schwaerme of four planes each, two low and two high, one of each set on either side of the flotilla flying in broad figure-eights along the length of the KM formation. Patrols to last 30 minutes with relief to take place over the naval force: approx. flight overlap time of 10 minutes. Strictest radio silence to be maintained (Luftwaffe fighter pilots were known for being extremely talkative while in flight) and all patrols to be maintained at minimum altitude until the command "open visor" was given, at which time all flights to go to their assigned altitudes. Interception of incoming enemy forces to be met as needed and radio silence relaxed. On-site LW commander was Ibel on the Scharnhorst; overall commander—and the one to issue the "open visor" command—was Galland at Audembert.

• Gun batteries

  Notes: Pas de Calais.

Including FAA aircraft, British losses reached 17 fighters and 26 bombers.