1. After the passage of PQ 18 in September 1942, the operations of the Arctic convoys were reviewed.
2. The Admiralty wished to sail one large convoy, with a large escort, as PQ 18 had been, but there were insufficient numbers of escorts.
3. This insistence meant that the convoys that did eventually sail missed the protection of the first half of the long dark winter nights from about mid-November onwards.
4. Admiral Tovey, C-in-C Home Fleet, pressed for two smaller convoys.
5. He considered that the lack of daylight would put a stop to air reconnaissance, and that smaller, easier handled convoys might evade both air and submarine attack. Small convoys were also easier to reform after bad weather.
6. The First Sea Lord insisted on two cruisers sailing all the way into the Barents Sea with the convoys. C-in-C Home Fleet afterward admitted that the First Sea Lord was correct.
7. As per PQ 18, C-in-C Home Fleet stayed at Scapa Flow in King George V to control the operations.
8. Convoy JW 51A was the first eastbound convoy, and left Loch Ewe on 15th December, arriving un-attacked on 25th December.

1. At this latitude and time of year, the sun does not rise more than 6o above the horizon, so that there is a period of twilight from about 0830 to 1630. This means that there would be about two and a half hours at midday when there will be sufficient light to find and attack the convoy, and to be able to distinguish ships at distances up to 10 miles. (The Battle of North Cape took place under similar visibility conditions).
2. With almost continuous darkness, the Germans were most likely to attack with surface ships, rather than U-boats.
3. Attacks by aircraft could be almost ruled out for the same reason.
4. He assumed that a surface attack would come from only one sector at a time.
5. At the first sign of an attack,
   1. the 5 destroyers of 17th Flotilla (Onslow, Obedient, Orbi, Obdurate, Orwell) would, without orders, leave their positions around the convoy and join on the threatened side in line ahead.
   2. The convoy would turn away from that direction, the rear merchantmen dropping smoke floats.
   3. The other 2 destroyers, Achates and Bulldog, would lay a smoke screen between the convoy and the enemy.
   4. The remaining escorts (Bramble, Hyderabad, Rhododendron, Northern Gem, Vizalma) re-form the escort screen on the convoy.
   5. The convoy to continue to alter course to keep the enemy astern.

1. The convoy would be covered from about 40 miles astern, avoiding any U-boats in contact with it.
2. The Germans would know the approximate course of JW 51B, but not how far along the course it was at any given time.
3. In fact Rear Admiral Burnett was given a position at 1600 / 29th that was 150 miles in error to the E, so that he passed ahead and not astern of the convoy.
4. Covering the convoy from the north gave his ships the advantage of what light there was.
5. The convoy may also have been scattered by the gale, and this had to be considered.

1. Before sailing, Admiral Klüber gave orders to Vizeadmiral Kummetz, Captains Hartman and Strange regarding Operation Regenboden (or Rainbow) as follows:

   The task: to destroy "PQ20" [as OKM identified JW 51B]. According to the existing report of U-354 the convoy is not strongly escorted... it is suspected that the two British cruisers and escorts that left Kola Inlet on 27th December are with the convoy, and it is expected that there are three or four enemy submarines at sea.

   Procedure on meeting the enemy: avoid a superior force, otherwise destroy according to the tactical situation.

   There was a separate plan for Lützow, Operation Aurora, an independent shakedown cruise after her recent refit, which she was to undertake after Regenboden. Roskill (1954) states that Lützow was under orders to break out into the Atlantic.
2. At 1840 / 30th, after sailing, Vizeadmiral Kummetz received another order:

   Contrary to the operational order regarding contact against the enemy, [you are to] use caution even against enemy of equal strength because it is undesirable for the cruisers to take any great risks.

1. He decided to attack the convoy during the two and a half hours of near daylight. He ruled out a night attack because of the risk from destroyers' torpedoes.
2. Both forces were to approach the convoy from astern, i.e. from the W.
3. The attack was to be made from both flanks.
4. The destroyers would be spread out in line abreast 15 miles apart in order to find the convoy, and Hipper and Lützow would attack from different directions to confuse the defences.
5. The destroyers were to spread out at 0800, but the convoy was identified at 0840, so the destroyers initially operated in 2 groups of three.
6. The British escorts would be drawn off by the first attack, leaving the convoy at the mercy of the second attack.
7. The German attack went according to plan.

Sailed from Loch Ewe 22nd December 1942, arrived Kola Inlet 3rd January 1943.

Total cargo of 2046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 fighters, 33 bombers, 11,500 tons fuel, 12,650 tons aviation fuel, 54,321 tons general cargo.

No rescue ship was provided, probably because the convoy was small, and equally possibly because none were available.

• Captain R.A. Melhuish, RIN

  Position: Commodore of Convoy

• Cmdr. Rust

  Position: Senior Officer, M/S Flotilla; Senior Officer, Close Escort

• Captain R.St.V. Sherbrooke, DSO

  Position: Captain D.17
• Cmdr. Rust

  Position: Senior Officer, Close Escort

Sailed from Murmansk 27th December.

• Rear Admiral R. Burnett

• HMS Sheffield (flagship)

  Commanding officer: Captain A.W. Clarke
• HMS Jamaica

  Commanding officer: Captain J.L. Storey
• 2 destroyer

  Notes: Detached to UK at 0800 / 29th December.
  • HMS Musketeer
  • HMS Matchless